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strument that can be shown to have been intended to be a mortgage. Possibly a long term lease, even one containing affirmative
covenants, could be shown by parol evidence to have been an
attempt by a lender to accomplish strict foreclosure upon default,
and therefore in reality only a mortgage. Why, then, could not
parol evidence be introduced to show that this oil and gas lease
was intended to terminate upon repayment of the debt? The peculiar circumstances in the Atwood case doubtless led the court
to the conclusion that any such attempt in the case would be futile.
But the parol evidence rule should not be applied to prevent in
every case the possibility of the lessor's sustaining a burden of
proving that the lease was in fact a security transaction under
which, upon repayment of the sum loaned, the lessor would be
entitled to a return of the property free from the burden of the
lease.

W. Dawson Sterling.

TORTS
TORT LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS

IN LOUISIANA

Louisiana. A Louisiana case brought up a question which has
caused much controversy in the law of torts. In Strahan v. Fussell'
plaintiff brought suit to recover damages as a result of the destruction of his automobile from dropping into a hole in a public
bridge. The defendant at the time of the accident was a member of
the police jury of his parish. Plaintiff alleged in his petition that it
was the custom of the police jury of that parish to allocate funds
to individual members of the jury for the purpose of road and
bridge repair and that there were sufficient funds for adequately
repairing the bridge. Defendant was aware of the condition of the
bridge because he had caused and supervised what repairs had been
1218

La. 682, 50 So. 2d 805 (1951).
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made. The repairs consisted of a runway of planks running with
the length of the bridge, while adequate repairs would have
necessitated replanking the whole section of the bridge containing
the hole. As the plaintiff drove his car onto the runway, the planks
turned with the weight of the car and dropped it into the hole.
Plaintiff negatived any negligence or assumption of risk on his
part by alleging that the condition of the bridge was unknown to
him. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit on defendant's
exception of no right of action. The dismissal was based on the
holding that defendant was exempt from liability for any act of
negligence which he was alleged to have committed because, as
disclosed by plaintiff's petition, he was a public officer, a member
of the police jury.
The supreme court held defendant liable for damages but did
not attempt to settle the question for Louisiana as to the personal
liability of public officers for failure to keep roads and bridges in
repair. Instead defendant was held liable on the ground that his
action in repairing the bridge was outside the scope of his authority.
Citing certain treatises and a law review article,2 the court made
the statement that immunity as a public officer exists "only so long
as he acts honestly and in good faith, and within the scope of his
authority. If he acts outside of his strict authority, he breaches the
condition of his immunity and is liable to persons harmed by his
improper conduct". 8 In order to find that the defendant acted outside the scope of his authority, the court held that allocating funds
to individual members of the police jury was an illegal act of the
body of which he was a member. When he acted to repair the
bridge, he assumed authority vested in the board as a whole and
therefore lost his immunity as a public officer.
When this particular case was before the court of appeals, it
attempted to settle the question as to liability of public officials for
2 Among others, HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 298; David, The Tort Liability of Public
Officers, 12 So. Calif. L. Rev. 127 (1939).

8 50 So. 2d at 807.
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negligence in repairing roads and bridges. The court of appeals
quoted from Corpus Juris:?
According to the weight of authority, the officers charged with the
duty of maintenance and repair of bridges are not personally liable for
injuries sustained by an individual by reason of their negligent failure
to perform their duty in this regard, in the absence of some statute
specifically imposing this liability. .. . The rule..., however, has

not received universal acceptance. It has been held that, where public
officers have the requisite funds in hand or under their control, they
are bound to repair bridges which are out of repair... with reasonable
and ordinary care and diligence; and if they omit this duty they are
liable to individuals who sustain damages from such neglect.
The court of appeals then said, "Since the supreme court has refused to elect between these two conflicting theories, it appears we
must make the election. For our part, we are willing to follow the
majority holding in 9 Corpus Juris." The supreme court struck the
holding down, stating emphatically that defendant was not
"charged with the duty" to repair the bridge. It was by this act that
he went beyond the scope of his official authority and lost his immunity as a public official. Once this immunity was found to be
gone, then Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code' applied and
made defendant liable for damages in a civil action.
As has been indicated, the question of tort liability of public
officials, has resulted in much conflict in the law of torts. No officer,
of course, is absolved from liability for his personal and private
torts merely because he is an officer, and the question arises only
where he performs, or purports to perform, his official functions.
Judges have always been accorded complete immunity for judicial
acts, even when their conduct is dictated by improper motives.'
The same absolute immunity extends to legislators and probably to
the highest executive officers of the state and federal governments.
As to lower administrative officials, however, there is no such absolute immunity for all acts. The courts have endeavored to apply
49 C. J., Bridges, § 69, p. 469. See also 11 C. J. S., Bridges, § 62.
6 "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another, obliges him by whose
fault it happens to repair it...."
6Sweeney v. Young, 82 N. H. 159, 131 Ad. 155 (1925).
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the rather unworkable distinction between acts which are regarded
as "quasi-judicial" or discretionary and those which are ministerial. Discretionary acts are those which require deliberation, decision, and judgment, while ministerial acts are those which amount
to an obedience to orders or the performance of a duty in which
there is no choice left. An immunity is extended for discretionary
acts, but the tendency is to limit it to acts done in good faith and
with good motives. For ministerial acts, on the other hand, the officer
is fully liable in tort. The distinction is, at most, one of degree,
since it is hard to imagine any act that does not require some discretion. Another distinction holds that all officers, including judges,
are liable if they act wholly outside of their jurisdiction or official
authority, even where the act is a discretionary one.' The decision
in this case added Louisiana to the jurisdictions applying this rule
of personal liability for action by public officials "outside the
scope of their authority".
Had the Louisiana Supreme Court chosen, it could have settled
the case on the precedent that an official is fully liable in tort for
ministerial acts. A case practically on all fours with this case is
Tholkes v. Decock.' Defendant in that case was a public official,
termed a township highway officer, charged with the duty to repair
highways and bridges. Defendant had undertaken to repair a culvert
and had left it open and uncovered overnight and without warning
signals of any kind. The plaintiff, without any knowledge of the
condition of the culvert, ran into it and was injured. The court
held that the repair of highways involves ministerial duties so far
as the actual repairs are concerned. The court held further that the
acts of defendant amounted to affirmative misconduct in the performance of a ministerial duty and that there could be no serious
question as to his liability. The court recognized that some authori7 Stiles v. Morse, 233 Mass. 174, 123 N. E. 615 (1919) (members of municipal council
held personally liable for unlawful method used in removing city treasurer) ; Lowe v.
Conroy, 120 Wis. 151, 97 N. W. 942 (1904) (public health officer held personally liable
for destruction of healthy cattle). It is interesting to note how narrowly "scope of
authority" of public officials is construed by the courts as compared with "scope of
authority" under the respondeat superior doctrine.
8 125 Minn. 507, 147 N. W. 648 (1914.
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ties decline to impose liability for mere failure to perform a ministerial duty on the theory that misfeasance, as distinguished from
nonfeasance, is required.9 Strong v. Day0 is a case applying the
stricter rule imposing liability for negligent failure to perform
ministerial duties. In that case a bridge had been left in such a condition for 17 months that it amounted to, as alleged in plaintiff's
petition, a "veritable death trap". The court said that after such a
length of time with adequate funds available, "the duty to repair
became ministerial, and if the defendants negligently failed to
perform that duty, they were liable to plaintiff in the absence of
contributory negligence on his part." Plainly the plaintiff's pleadings in the Louisiana case charged defendant with affirmative misconduct, but perhaps decision on a basis which avoids the troublesome distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance is to be
preferred. In any event, it is submitted that the court was correct
in holding defendant liable for his tort.
Irrespective of whether an act is regarded as discretionary or
ministerial, or outside the scope of his authority, it is difficult to
see any just basis for a public official's escaping liability for his
negligence merely because of his position. An official should neither
suffer for an honest and reasonable mistake in the effort to carry
out his responsibility to the public, nor should he escape liability
for negligence because of his official position. The test for liability
should be made to depend on whether the officer has acted with
proper motives and with due care in the performance of his official
duties. Suct a view is being advocated more and more by writers
on the subject of tort liability of public officials.12
9 It is to be noted that the passage from CoRPus JuRis quoted supra uses the phrase
"negligent failure to perform their duty," and Tholkes v. Decock may therefore be
reconciled with the "weight of authority" therein referred to.
10 61 Okla. 166, 160 Pac. 722 (1916).
11 Jennings, Tort Liability ol Administrative Officers, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 263 (1937);
and GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw (Cases and Comments) (1940) 402-414.
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Is SPECULATION A BASIS FOR DETERMINING

TORT LIABILITY?

New Mexico. Ortegav. Koury 2 is a recent 3-2 decision involving
negligent driving. Plaintiff administrator brought action for the
death of a 31/2-year-old child caused by being run over by defendant's automobile. The defendant on May 12, 1948, between
12:00 noon and 1:00 P.M., was driving north on a paved road 21
feet wide. His automobile was the only car on the road, and evidence was introduced on trial that there was an unobstructed view
of the street for 600 feet. Defendant testified that he was travelling
around 10-15 miles per hour when the child was struck, and in
support of his testimony it was shown that his car was stopped 20
feet from the point of impact. The major conflict in the testimony
and actually the deciding point in the case concerned where the
child was struck. Defendant said the child was found lying three to
five feet from the east sideline after being hit, while the policeman
covering the accident said there was broken glass from the right
headlight of the defendant's automobile 10 feet from the east sideline, or 6 inches from the centerline of the street, and a pool of
blood. No one had seen the child for 15 minutes prior to the accident, and neither the defendant nor any of the four people riding
with him saw the child in the street. The case was tried without a
jury, and the trial court resolved the issues in favor of defendant.
The majority after reviewing the evidence reversed the trial court
and remanded the case for assessment of damages.
For the majority to find the defendant guilty of negligence, it was
necessary to find a legal duty to conform to a certain standard of
conduct for the protection of others against harm and a failure to
conform to the standard. Defendant and his other witnesses had
testified they had not seen the child before the accident. The
standard to which the defendant had to conform was found in
Corpus Juris Secundum1 8 and in Gregware v. Polquin.4 The
N. M .. ,227 P. 2d 941 (1951).
"8 60 C. J. S., Motor Vehicles, § 284(c), p. 667.
"4 135 Me. 139, 190 Atl. 811 (1937).
12 ------
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standard stated in the former authority was: "In order to keep a
proper look-out, a motorist must do more than merely look; it is
his duty to see and be cognizant of what is in plain view or obviously
apparent, and he is chargeable with seeing what he should have
seen, but not with what he could not have seen in the exercise of
ordinary care." In the Gregware case the court said, "Whenever it is
the duty of a person to look for danger, mere looking will not suffice. One is bound to see what is obviously apparent. If the failure
of a motor vehicle operator to see that which by the exercise of
reasonable care he should have seen is the proximate cause of an
injury to another, he is liable in damages for his negligence."15
Having found the required standard of care to be the duty "to
look and to see what should be seen", the majority not only had to
disbelieve the testimony of not seeing the child but had to believe
the child had been hit in the middle of the street rather than towards
the side. As stated above, it was the location of the broken glass and
pool of blood which decided the case because it gave credence to
the majority's belief that defendant was negligent. The court said,
"Physical facts and conditions may point so unerringly to the
truth as to leave no room for a contrary conclusion based on reason
or common sense, and under such circumstances the physical facts
are not affected by sworn testimony which in mere words conflicts
with them. When the surrounding facts and circumstances make the
story of a witness incredible, or when the testimony is inherently
improbable, such evidence is not substantial."' 6 The court recognized the rule that when a trial court's finding is based on substantial evidence, the finding will not be disturbed. But the court
felt this rule did not relieve it of the duty to examine the facts to
see if the findings were based upon substantial evidence. "The
power of a court of review ought not to be left paralyzed so as to
prevent a miscarriage of justice, merely by the erroneous findings
of a trial court or the verdict of a jury."'" Defendant's testimony
15 190 At. at 813.
16 227 P. 2d at 942.
17 Id. at 944, quoting from Thuringer v. Grafton, 58 Colo. 250, 144 Pac. 866, 868
(1914).
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plainly appeared so incredible to the majority as to be unworthy of
belief. The theory adopted as to the true state of facts was that
the defendant saw the child crossing the street, and, instead of
stopping, swerved to go around; therefore, the defendant was negli-

gent for not recognizing the danger and as a matter of law violated
his duty of care. Even if the child had not been seen, application
of the standard as defined would convict him of negligence if the
circumstances indicated he had not kept a proper look-out.
This case is noteworthy because, according to the dissenting
opinion, two well-settled rules in New Mexico were overruled. One
rule followed previous to this decision was that evidence in a case
would be viewed in all its aspects most favorable to support a
judgment.'" In this case the majority relied on evidence most favorable to a reversal of the judgment. The minority said that had the

majority followed the well-settled rule, the case would have been
decided on the following facts. The defendant was driving at a
speed of 10-15 miles per hour with his car under control; he
stopped within 20 feet from the point of impact; he was driving on
the right hand side of the street watching the road; neither the

defendant nor his passengers saw the child in the street before it
was struck three to five feet from the right side of the street; and no
one saw the child for at least 15 minutes prior to the accident. The
child was struck approximately opposite the northerly edge of his
yard, and at that spot adjacent to the street there was a large telephone pole. There was a sidewalk separated from the street by a few
feet, and then next to the sidewalk, a fence enclosing the child's
yard. A vine was growing on the fence, and there were two trees in
the yard.
The other rule that had not been modified or overruled until this
case was stated in Cerillos Coal R. Co. v. Deserant.9 According to
the dissent in the principal case, the rule announced there was:
"where it was purely speculative as to which of two ways an ex18 Griego v. Conwell, 54 N. M. 287, 222 P. 2d 606 (1950) ; Brown v. Cobb, 53 N. M.
169, 204 P. 2d 264 (1949).
19 9 N. M. 49, 49 Pac. 807 (1897).
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plosion causing injuries originated, the verdict should be for the
defendant if, by either or both, the defendant was exempt from
liability."20 Even by discrediting the testimony of the defendant,
the actual facts of the accident must remain speculative, since no
one saw the accident. While the circumstantial evidence of the
location of the blood and broken glass may be very persuasive, it is
not conclusive of negligence. The judge writing the dissenting
opinion closed with these words: "By considering only the evidence
most favorable to the plaintiff, and then injecting the doctrine of
last clear chance, adding a dash of res ipsa loquitur, indulging in
surmise, conjecture and speculation, the majority determine the
defendant guilty of negligence as a matter of law, reverse a contrary finding and judgment, and direct the trial court to assess the
damages. As all the cases I find on the subject hold to the contrary,
I dissent."'"
Negligence has been defined as conduct which falls below the
standard established by law for the protection of others against
unreasonably great risk of harm. 2 The standard imposed by society
is an external one and is not necessarily based on any moral fault
of the individual, although as the probability of injury becomes
more apparent from facts within the person's knowledge, his conduct takes on more of the attributes of intent until it may become inseparable from intent itself. The almost universal use of the phrase
"due care" to describe conduct which is not negligent should not be
permitted to obscure the fact that the real basis of negligence is
not carelessness, but behavior which should be recognized as involving unreasonable danger to others.2" Negligence is conduct,
and the standard of conduct required of an individual is usually
dealt with in terms of duty. Duty is a question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of the plaintiff; and
in negligence cases the duty is always the same, to conform to the
20 227 P. 2d at 945.
21 Id. at 946.
22 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 282.
23 Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence, and Indifference; the Relation of Mental
States to Negligence, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 849 (1926).
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legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent
risk. Acceptable conduct is generally measured against what a
reasonably prudent man would have done under like or similar circumstances, although applying this standard is very difficult because of the infinite variety of situations that may arise. Consequently, allowance must be made for factors such as apparent risk,
the person's capacity to meet it and the circumstances under which
it must be met.
Did the defendant in this case violate the standard of care required of him? There are many situations in which the hypothetical
reasonable man would be expected to anticipate and guard against
the conduct of others. One of these situations arises when it may be
anticipated that a child may dash into the path of a car. Taylor v.
2 4 is a case illustrating
Patterson's Administrator
liability in connection with children. Defendant in that case was franchised to
operate a jitney bus and each day carried plaintiff's intestate, a
child of less than seven years, from his home to school and back.
On the day of the accident defendant let the child out of the bus
across the street from his home. The street carried a great deal of
traffic. The child was struck by a truck as he attempted to cross the
street. The court said, "It is not reasonable to reach any other conclusion than that the duty of Taylor did not end when the passenger
Billy Patterson alighted upon the sidewalk, but ... continued...
until he was safely across Greenup Avenue ....'It is a reasonable
and necessary rule that a higher degree of care should be exercised
toward a child incapable of using discretion commensurate with the
perils of his situation than one of mature age and capacity ....25
Guillory v. Heckory2 6 is another case dealing with the duty owed
to children but is more analogous to the case at hand. Some children were playing tag on the side of a street. Defendant was driving
a truck and trailer toward where they were playing and clearly
24 272
25 114
Rep. 193,
26 185

Ky. 415, 114 S. W. 2d 488 (1938).
S.W. 2d at 490, quoting from Bransom's Adm. v. Lakrot, 81 Ky. 638, 50 Am.
196 (1884).
La. 21, 168 So. 481 (1936).
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saw them. An 11-year-old girl was killed as she dashed into the
street. The court held, "The situation called at once, on his part, for
great care. He should have gotten down to a very moderate speed
and held his truck well in hand, ready to stop or swerve as might
be necessary to avoid the result of an impulsive act on the part of
the children."2 7 The uncontroverted evidence in the present case
that defendant stopped 20 feet from the point of impact tends to
bear out his testimony that he was driving 10-15 miles per hour.
However, he might have been travelling at such a speed that after
applying his brakes, long before reaching the point of impact, he
was only able to stop 20 feet beyond the point of impact. But considering his testimony as true, it would rule out of the case any
recklessness or bad intent. That would leave the question of whether
he saw the child and then failed to act as a reasonable man. In the
Guillory case, supra, defendant saw the children and had sufficient
warning to act, but in the principal case the defendant said he did
not see the child. Is it then the duty of every motorist to drive in the
constant expectation of danger which requires the immediate action
of the "mythical reasonable man" even in an emergency? The
emergency doctrine does not hold a person to the same standard as
one who has had time to reflect; his choice may be mistaken and
yet prudent.
How would the doctrine of res ispa loquitur apply to the case?
The elements of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the accident is one which
does not ordinarily occur in the absence of someone's negligence,
(2) it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of
the defendant, and (3) the possibility of contributing conduct on the
part of plaintiff is eliminated. Whether defendant had exclusive
control of the instrumentality could certainly be questioned if the
child's presence in the street is considered part of the instrumentality. As to the third element, there would be a strong possibility for
it to exist, since the child was capable of very little contributory
negligence, if any. The minimum age for children to be capable of
2?

168 So. at 483.
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negligence has been arbitrarily set by some courts at around seven
years,"8 but the weight of authority holds that no arbitrary limit
should be set. Probably the irreducible minimum is around three
years of age.29 That leaves only the first element of the doctrine for
consideration. Ample authority can be found holding that the mere
fact that an automobile collides with a pedestrian does not raise a
presumption of negligence." A good many of the cases deal with
accidents involving children. Since no one saw the accident occur,
then according to this authority no presumption would be inferred
from the mere collision. Negligence would have to be proved by the
circumstances of the case, and in the instant case the evidence relied
upon was circumstantial - the position of the blood and broken
glass. "The mere fact that an accident or an injury has occurred,
with nothing more, is not evidence of negligence.... What is required is evidence from which reasonable men may conclude that,
upon the whole, it is more likely that there was negligence than that
there was not." In Lawson v. Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co.82 the
court ruled: "An inference of negligence must be based on something more than mere conjecture or speculation, and it is not sufficient to introduce evidence of a state of facts simply consistent with
or indicating a mere possibility, or which suggests with equal force
and leaves fully as reasonable an inference of the nonexistence of
negligence." The New Mexico case, Cerillos CoalR. Co. v. Deserant,
supra, ruled substantially the same as the Lawson case.
The minority opinion seems to be the sounder, based on the facts
and circumstances of this case. It is true that the testimony was very
unsatisfactory in explaining what actually happened. The explanation adopted by the majority is very plausible, but equally as
plausible explanations could be imagined whereby defendant would
not be guilty of negligence. It seems there is a large area left open
Chicago City Ry. v. Tuohy, 196 Ill.
410, 63 N. E. 997 (1902).
(1941) 231.
so See Notes, 5 A. L. R. 1240 (1920), 64 id.
255, 258 (1929), 93 id.1101, 1110 (1934).
81 PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 292.
82 184 Okla. 107, 84 P. 2d 1104, 1105 (1938), quoting from the syllabus in Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry. v. Smith, 160 Okla. 287, 16 P. 2d 226, 227 (1932).
28

20 PROSSER, TORTS
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in the majority opinion in which reasonable men could find there
was no negligence, but merely an unfortunate and unavoidable accident. It would be interesting to know what difference it would
have made in the outcome if this case had been originally tried before a jury.
The majority opinion did not discuss the cases that were cited by
the minority as being overruled. If the majority considered that
those cases were being overruled, it is logical to assume that some
reasons would have been given by the majority. Therefore, the
minority statement that this case overrules two well-settled New
Mexico rules cannot be taken at face value. It remains for the future
to determine whether this decision will be extended to other situations, distinguished, or harmonized with prior decisions.

Samuel M. Mires, Jr.

IMMUNITY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION -

WHAT IS A

GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION?

Texas. The dual character of the municipal corporation has long
given the courts difficulty. On the one hand the corporation is a subdivision of the state and on the other it is a corporate entity with
much the same interests as a private corporation. As a matter of
common knowledge it is quite often found in competition with private corporations.
In its governmental capacity as a subdivision of the state the
municipal corporation has been protected from liability under the
broad spread of the principle which holds that the state is immune
from liability. This principle was at first extended to include all of
the acts of the municipality,33 but in 1842 the immunity was narrowed by the distinction which was drawn between "governmental"
and "proprietary" functions. The immunity was limited to liabilities incurred in the performance of governmental functions.""
88 Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T. R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K. B. 1798).
84 Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669 (N. Y. 1942).
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This distinction has been preserved until the present in practically
all jurisdictions including Texas.
The classifications of particular functions has not proved easy.
The shifting line of demarcation between "governmental" and
"proprietary" functions has furnished a battle ground and a challenge for those who favor responsible government and who look
with disfavor upon the notion that "the King can do no wrong." The
criticism of the general principle of governmental immunity has
found expression in the narrowing of the immunity of the municipal
corporation. The result is an extension of municipal liability,
usually by the route of finding that the particular function involved
is not a "governmental" one. Such is the nature of a recent, interesting Texas case.
In City of Houston v. Shillinge, the Texas Supreme Court, with
four justices dissenting, moved to restrict the immunities86 of
municipalities. The case has been noted with interest in Texas and
elsewhere87 and seems clearly in line with the tendency of other
jurisdictions."
Mrs. Birdie Shilling was injured in a collision between her automobile and the City of Houston's garbage truck. The jury found
that the injuries suffered by Mrs. Shilling were caused by (1) negligent operation of the garbage truck by its driver and (2) the negligent failure on the part of city employees to inspect and repair
brakes on the garbage truck immediately before the collision. The
court conceded that the City would not have been liable for the
negligent truck operation under the well.established rule of the
George case,89 which held garbage collection to be a governmental
s5 .Tex.

,240 S. W. 2d 1010 (1951).

86 See City of Houston v. Quinones, 142 Tex. 282, 177 S. W. 2d 259 (1944) ; Kemp.
Hotel Operating Co. v. City of Wichita Falls, 141 Tex. 90, 170 S. W. 2d 217 (1943) ; City
of Port Arthur v. Wallace, 141 Tex. 201, 171 S. W. 2d 480 (1943) ; City of Amarillo v.
Ware, 120 Tex. 456, 40 S. W. 2d 57 (1931) ; City of Fort Worth v. George, 108 S. W. 2d

929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) er. ref.

87 Recent Cases, 4 Baylor L. Rev. 92 (1951), 30 Tex. L. Rev. 266 (1951), 13 U. Pittsburgh L. Rev. 438 (1952).
8SSee PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 1068; Note, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 305 (1932).
89 City of Fort Worth v. George, cited supra note 36.
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function. The majority looked instead to the jury's finding that the
injuries were caused by the negligent failure to inspect and repair
and held that there was nothing to relieve the City from liability,
since the maintenance of such inspection and repair facilities was
not a governmental function.
It is apparent then that the technical point upon which the case
hinged was the determination of whether the inspection and repair
of the garbage trucks was or was not a "governmental" function.
The minority felt strongly that the operation of the garage was as
much a part of the gathering and disposal of garbage as was the
driving of the trucks and that such garage operation was "in truth
a part of the very performance" of the governmental function. The
majority, however, felt that "a line must be drawn" at which
municipal immunity must end, and made the interesting observation that "[i]t could just as easily be contended that since it is
necessary that the trucks have gasoline that the city could maintain
service stations or oil wells and refineries, and that in these operations the city would be immune to liability."4 The majority noted
that the precise question had not been passed on by the Texas courts
and that the repair and maintenance of city vehicles had been held
not to be a governmental function in other jurisdictions, 4 ' and that
a holding contrary to these decisions would operate to extend the
immunity now allowed cities. This extension of immunity the court
refused to make, saying, "the maintenance of a garage.., is not a
governmental function nor a necessary element of a governmental
function so as to relieve the city from liability. ..
The majority opinion, though rationalized on a technical basis,
appears to have been inspired by a broader purpose. It points out
that the doctrine of immunity has often been criticized and questioned and that public policy does not demand a departure from a
40 240 S. W. 2d at 1012.
41 Bertiz v. City of Los Angeles, 74 Cal. App. 792, 241 Pac. 921 (1925) ; Levin v. City
of Omaha, 102 Neb. 328, 167 N. W. 214 (1918) ; City of Muskogee v. Magee, 177 Okla.
39, 57 P. 2d 252 (1936) ; Oklahoma City v. Haggard, 170 Okla. 473, 41 P. 2d 150 (1935);
Oklahoma City v. Foster, 118 Okla. 120, 247 Pac. 80, 47 A. L. R. 822 (1926).
42 240 S. W. 2d at 1013.
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strict limitation of such immunity of municipalities for their torts.
That the import of the decision was clearly recognized by the
minority of the court is indicated by the words of Justice Smedley,
dissenting: "The decision of the majority appears.., to be influenced by disapproval of the rule that exempts cities from liability
for negligence in the performance of governmental functions....
It would be better for the Court to meet the question squarely and
better that the law...
overrule the prior decisions. It would be still
' 43
enactment.
legislative
by
...
be changed
The result seems fair and sensible because there is no longer any
real need for municipal immunity. The method of reaching the
result may be criticized on the ground that it further complicates an
already "absurd and distressing mess of 'spotted and striped'
law."" Whether or not one approves of the trend, one must admit
that the scope of governmental activity is being continually enlarged. In view of this fact it is particularly heartening to note that
there is another trend in the direction of responsible government.
Even though the movement is made by a delimiting of an "immunity," it is none the less a step toward increasing the government's responsibility in tort. Borchard45 has observed, "The whole
course of history, with slight though infrequent interruptions, has
been toward responsible government, that is, responsible toward
those for whose benefit and needs it presumably exists."46 The Federal Tort Claims Act4 is an illustration of this trend. There is much
truth in Professor Borchard's statement: "The community will gain
by promoting respect among its members for its fairness and justice
and, instead of relying upon antiquated formulas to escape liability,
48 Id. at

1015, 1016.

44 Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction between Public and Private Functions

in Respect to the Common Law Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations,16 Ore. L. Rev.
250, 269 (1937).
45 Professor Edwin M. Borchard has written an exhaustive series of articles entitled
"Government Liability in Tort" appearing in 34 Yale L. J. 1, 129 (1924), 229 (1925);
36 Yale L. J. 1 (1926), 757, 1030 (1927) ; 28 Col. L. Rev. 577, 734 (1928).
46 Government Liability in Tort, 36 Yale L. J. 1039, 1099 (1927).
47 28 U. S. C. 1946 ed. Supp. V, § 1346.
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it will meet the exigencies of modern organized life by discharging
what the rest of the world recognizes as just obligations." 48
NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT -

How

MAY PROXIMATE

CAUSE BE SHOWN?

In Spratling v. Butler4 9 an employer had entrusted a truck to an
employee without first ascertaining whether the employee had a
valid driver's license. On the night of the second day following his
employment, after he had consumed two bottles of beer and while
on a mission wholly of his own, the employee ran the truck off the
road and into the plaintiff's house. The case was not tried on any
claim that the employee was acting in the course of his employment
when he ran into the house but on the theory that the employer had
entrusted the truck to the employee knowing that his license had
expired or without using ordinary care to find out that it had
expired.
The jury found (1) that unknown to the employer the employee's
license had expired at the time when he was hired but that the
employer was negligent in not ascertaining the fact; and (2) that
the employee was operating the truck in a negligent manner, which
negligence was a proximate cause of the collision with the house.
The district court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, but the court
of civil appeals felt that the result of the employee's drinking two
beers and driving off the road was not included within the risk
which the employer took in letting the employee drive without ascertainment of the status of the license. Accordingly, the trial court
was reversed on a holding that a showing of proximate cause was
necessary to connect the employer's negligence with the damage occasioned to the plaintiff.
In an earlier case, Mundy v. Pirie-SlaughterMotor Company,50
the plaintiff had attempted to establish negligence per se by proving
48
49

Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L. J. 258 (1925).
-.........
Tex.---............240 S. W. 2d 1016 (1951), rev'g 237 S. W. 2d 793 (Tex. Civ. App.

1951).
50 146 Tex. 314, 206 S. W. 2d 587 (1947).
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the defendant's violation of a statute by his lending to an unlicensed
driver. The Texas court said, "The purpose of the statute which defendant is alleged to have violated is to prevent the lending of automobiles to persons not shown by examination and license to be competent to drive, and the danger anticipated and intended to be
prevented by statute is the such persons, if given opportunity to
drive, will do so negligently and thereby cause damage to other persons." 1 The court held that, although the statute prohibits lending
only where the owner knows and that a statutory violation could be
found only where the owner had actual knowledge, nevertheless the
statute also determined what should be the standard of care of the
reasonable man in such circumstances and what results should be
reasonably foreseeable to the average automobile owner. The court
in the case indicated that when the negligent driving, which proximately caused the injury, was a danger designed by the statute to be
prevented (i.e., arising from entrustment to a person not shown by
examination and license to be competent), and the plaintiff was one
of the class designed to be protected (i.e., third person injured by
negligence of such driver), then the causal connection between the
employer's act of entrustment and the plaintiff's injury was shown.
Upon appeal of the principal case to the supreme court the judgment of the court of civil appeals which stated the necessity for a
finding of proximate cause was reversed in a curious manner.
The court, speaking through Justice Brewster, held that the judgment of the court of civil appeals was contrary to Mundy v. PirieSlaughter Motor Co. The opinion quoted from three consecutive
sentences of the Mundy opinion, omitting only the middle sentence
which is the one quoted in the paragraph above. The substance of
the opinion is as follows: "If, after the automobile is entrusted
to such driver, he operates is negligently, and thereby causes damages to a third person, the causal connection is shown between the
51 Id. at 321, 206 S. W. 2d at 591. Emphasis added.
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negligence of the owner in lending him the automobile and the damage to the third person."5 On the basis of this principle the court
held that the trial court's charge had adequately submitted the issue
of proximate cause; the judgment of the court of civil appeals was
reversed and that of the trial court was affirmed. Is this principle
sound?
The defendants had argued that their negligence in not ascertaining the facts relating to the employee's license was immaterial
because (1) the employee was driving against orders and without
permission on a mission of his own and (2) there was no proof that
the truck was out of control at the time, only that the man was
drunk. The supreme court held that under its previous holdings
"those considerations are without significance in a case of negligent
entrustment."
That there is a certain risk involved in entrusting a vehicle to
one "not shown by examination and license to be competent to
drive" will go without dispute. That the defendant's liability should
extend to injuries which are results within this risk will likewise go
with little dispute. It is when the defendant's liability is extended to
results which are difficult to find within the risk (e.g., those caused
by drunkenness and carelessness as distinguished from incompetence) that there is great room for question.
In the subject case it is even more difficult to justify the conclusion that the result was within the risk since the employee was not
one of those "not shown by examination and license to be competent
to drive." The evidence in the case showed that he had been examined and had been licensed. The evidence did not show that he
had lost his skill since the expiration of his license. His failing, so
far as appeared from the evidence, was solely one of not having sent
the Department of Public Safety $1.00 for a renewal.
The question whether a master should be responsible for injuries
caused by his servant's carelessness or drunkenness while in performance of a task for which he was hired is an entirely different
52

Ibid.; quoted in the principal case, 240 S. W. 2d at 1017.
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one; the liability of the master is not based upon his own participation in the wrong. In the subject case the servant was on a mission
"wholly his own", and no attempt was made to find vicarious liability for the servant's tort, since he was without the scope of his
employment. Where the negligence of the principal himself is the
issue, one cannot avoid asking these questions: What was foreseeable by him? What was the risk which made his conduct negligent?
Should his liability be extended beyond that risk?
Suppose the driver in the principal case had absconded and
driven the truck to California and there caused the deaths of three
persons by his careless driving. Certainly it would not have been
held that defendant was liable simply because, in the language of
the Texas court, "after the automobile is entrusted to such driver,
he operates it negligently, and thereby causes damages to a third
person." It would probably have been held that this result was not
foreseeable and that the defendant therefore was not liable (either
on the theory of want of duty to the plaintiff, or want of proof of
proximate cause). Where is the dividing line? Is there any real
difference between the subject case and the leaving of a key in a car
so that an unauthorized person may take it and drive it negligently
against the plaintiff? On the facts of this case, to say the least,
reasonable men might conclude that this was a result outside the
foreseeable risk, if not being forced to this conclusion as a matter
of law.
This case has extended the employer's liability for "negligent
entrustment." It is not plain just where is placed the limiting line
on this extension, short of absolute liability for all ensuing consequences of negligent driving even during unauthorized use of a
vehicle by the one to whom it was entrusted. Nor is it perfectly clear
that there is such a line.
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How

391

FAR WILL THE

"CONSENT" EXTEND?

The doctrine of assumption of risk in its primary sense has been
generally held to be in the nature of a contractual relationship and
therefore limited to controversies between master and servant. In
its broader sense, however, the doctrine extends beyond contractual
relationships 3 with the test being designated by the maxim, volenti
non fit injuria," and consisting of the two conditions that the injured
party (1) must have known of and appreciated the danger, and (2)
must have voluntarily assented thereto.
An interesting example of an attempted application of this latter
doctrine was recently before the Texas Supreme Court in Wood v.
Kane Boiler Works, Inc." In this case defendant boiler works was
in the process of manufacturing steel pipe for a large gas transmission company, the pipe being made by rolling sheets of steel to the
proper shape and then welding the two edges which were drawn
together to form the cylinder. The transmission company had contracted with a commercial testing laboratory to have tests made of
the pipe at the boiler works as soon as each section was completed.
The plaintiff wife's decedent husband was employed by the testing laboratory and stationed at the boiler works to test the pipe,
and it was while so engaged that he was killed.
An improperly welded seam burst at a pressure of 980 pounds
per square inch when an attempt was being made to subject it to
1000 pounds. The stream of water which resulted from this failure
struck plaintiff's husband and propelled him violently for some distance causing his death shortly thereafter.
In trying to determine just what dangers the husband knew of
and appreciated and voluntarily assented to, the court looked very
carefully at the defective weld, the methods of construction used,
and the aids that were available to the defendant in assuring that
the weld had been properly made. It is of paramount importance
53 PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 385; B. Shoninger Co. v. Mann, 219 Ill.
242, 76 N. E. 354
(1905).
54 "That to which a person assents is not esteemed in law an injury."
05 --- Tex. -, 238 S. W. 2d 172 (1951).
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that such a weld be made exactly upon the seam created by the
drawing together of the two edges of the plate. A piece of the burst
pipe which was submitted in evidence showed that the weld had not
been centered over the seam. The husband had nothing to do with
the operation of the welding machine, nor was he under any duty
of supervising it. The court pointed out that not only was there a
way prescribed in the industry by which the boiler works might
have properly welded the seam but also that "there was a gauge test
which it had agreed to use and which it could quickly and easily
make after welding this seam to determine whether the weld had
been properly centered and properly applied."5' 6
Defendant contended and a vigorous dissenting opinion agreed
that plaintiff's husband had consented to search out just such negligently created dangers. This conclusion as to what was in the deceased husband's mind seems to require a far stretch of the imagination when the method of inspection is taken into consideration. It
appeared that water would be turned into a completed length of
pipe and then the pressure raised to the required 1000 pounds. The
inspector would then move along the pipe, keeping his head close to
the seam, and strike continuously on or near the weld with a hammer in order to find, in the words of the dissenting justice, "defects
that were so latent that they ... could be seen only under a magnifying glass." 57 Had the pipe's bursting been one of the risks consented
to, it seems logical to assume that the pipe would have been handled
in a more indirect manner.
The majority of the court held that the husband had no knowledge that the ordinary precautions, which would have resulted in
the discovery of the defect, had not been taken, and that the husband had consented to search only for minor imperfections remaining after all due care had been taken. His going on with the work
could therefore not have been consent for the boiler works to disregard its obligations to take those precautions.
Charles G. Thrash, Jr.
Id. at 178.
57 Id. at 180.
56

